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“[When] Samira, a Bedouin woman from one of the villages in the Naqab1 
desert of Israel, found out about her husband’s intentions to marry a 
second wife, she decided to resist her polygamous husband. Samira filed a 
complaint at the Israeli police station.  The Bedouin policeman refused to 
register her complaint saying: ‘Do you want to get me into trouble with 
your tribe?’2  She went to the head of the police station, an Israeli (Jew) 
that told her, ‘I cannot do anything about it, it is an internal matter I 
suggest you to talk with the Sheikh.’3 She went to the Sheikh and was told, 
‘I don’t understand what do you want from me, your husband can marry 
more than one wife.  He is a Muslim, isn’t he?”4 
 
It is easier to write an article that tackles a legal issue than an article 
                                                          
 1. In Hebrew, the southern part of Israel is called the Negev.  I will use the word 
“Naqab,” which is the Arabic term for the region. 
 2. In the Bedouin society there is a hierarchical division between the tribes based 
on their historical origin as Bedouins. 
 3. See Sheikh – Definition, WORDIQ,COM, http://www.wordiq.com 
/definition/Sheikh (last visited Sept. 28, 2010) (defining the term “Sheikh” as (1) a high 
status leader or (2) religious figure). 
 4. The author is a Arab Bedouin woman who works with other Bedouin women. 
Therefore, this analysis of the Bedouin society takes place from both an inside and 
outside perspective. 
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analyzing an interdisciplinary issue.  With respect to a legal question, it is 
usually clear which issue is pending, which law was violated, which right 
was harmed, and which methods are available for rectifying the injustice.  
The arena of action is the legal arena, the tools are legal tools, and the 
language is legal language. 
But how do we tackle an issue that is simultaneously legal, social, 
cultural, and political, and that pertains to the Arab Bedouin women in the 
Naqab?  How do we deal with the phenomenon of multiple wives in the 
Naqab, a phenomenon that is gaining momentum and reaching a rate of up 
to thirty percent?5  How do we deal with the invisibility of Bedouin women 
in polygamous marriages, the invisibility of citizens in the eyes of the 
Israeli law, and the invisibility of women in the eyes of the Bedouin 
society?  How do we crack the conspiracy of silence surrounding the 
phenomenon of polygamy, and discern the mechanisms that perpetuate it 
and those who have an interest in perpetuating it? 
The aim of this study is to explore theories that explain why polygamy 
has increased within the Palestinian Bedouin population of the Naqab in 
Israel.  It serves as a framework to unmask the mechanisms of power in 
those societies in which polygamy takes place and suggests alternative 
explanations for the increased prevalence of polygamy among the 
Palestinian Bedouin population.  As we begin to discuss the phenomenon 
of polygamy, we must take into account the broader context in which 
polygamy occurs.  We must analyze the changes that Bedouin women have 
faced in the last sixty years, which have led to both the oppression and 
agency of Bedouin women.  We must take into account that Bedouin 
women are not helpless, frozen in time and space, and that culture is fluid 
and exists as a true space of agency.  We also must analyze the mechanisms 
of power that operate to silence and debilitate Bedouin women, and to 
preserve their absence and transparency. 
Polygamy in the Arab Bedouin society is not a phenomenon that occurs 
in a vacuum.  It operates in the intersection of colonial power6 and 
patriarchal power.  These terms—“patriarchy” and “colonialism”—are 
loaded words.  In this context, colonial power is the way in which Israel 
                                                          
 5. See Orly Lotan, Polygamy Among the Bedouin Community in Israel, KNESSET 
RES. AND INFO. CTR. 1, 1 (2006) (in Hebrew), http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm 
(providing estimates that confirm polygamy exists among twenty to thirty-six percent 
of households in the Naqab); see also Aref Abu-Rabia et al., Polygyny and Post-
nomadism Among the Bedouin in Israel, 3 ANTHROPOLOGY MIDDLE EAST 20, 23 
(2008) (estimating that close to forty percent of Bedouin women are in polygamous 
marriages, a significant increase from previous estimates).  
 6. See Oren Yiftachel, Epilogue: Studying Naqab/Negev Bedouins: Toward a 
Colonial Paradigm?, 8 HAGAR STUD. CULTURE, POLITY & IDENTITIES (Special Issue) 1, 
3 (2008) (adopting the colonial paradigm to assess key aspects of Bedouin life in the 
Naqab). 
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exercises its political power as a State towards its non-Jewish citizens. 
Colonial power segregates Bedouin society internally by supporting the 
traditional tribal system and by condoning practices such as polygamy.7  
Patriarchal power is the way in which Bedouin men exercise their 
domination over Bedouin women in a hierarchical society based on gender 
differences. 
Such power simultaneously operates both actively and reactively within 
the Bedouin society and in relation to the State and its colonial power. The 
State of Israel’s colonial power operates alongside the patriarchal power of 
Bedouin men.  The division between the mechanisms of power is not 
binary but changes constantly.  The exercise of the colonial power by the 
State of Israel encourages patriarchy and weakens Bedouin women.  The 
operation of these powers leads eventually to the externalization of 
polygamy from the legal system and to the invisibility of Bedouin women 
in the eyes of the law. 
Part II of this Article will examine the existing research on polygamy, 
alongside the changes that Bedouin women have experienced in the last 
sixty years.  It will also address the reasons that prevent Bedouin women 
from resisting polygamy.  Part III will address the legal dimension of 
polygamy under international law, Israeli criminal law, and personal law as 
governed by Shari’a.  Part IV will analyze this research and will include a 
presentation of polygamy’s alternative genealogies.  This Article will frame 
the exercise of colonial power through Israel’s land confiscation, 
urbanization, and economic and international political policies.  This 
Article will then study patriarchal power as a suppressive power reactive to 
the State’s colonial power.  It will analyze how the operation of these 
powers leads to the invisibility of Bedouin women by the externalization of 
polygamy from the legal system.  Part V will look beyond the binary of the 
colonizer/colonized and examine whether Bedouin women are powerless.  
This Article will conclude by addressing polygamy as a case study and 
demonstrate the mechanisms of colonial and patriarchal powers, which 
silence and debilitate Bedouin women. 
II. THE PALESTINIAN BEDOUIN WOMEN IN ISRAEL 
Bedouin women have been through significant social, economic, and 
political changes.  These changes have affected their status as women, their 
gender relations, and the prevalence of polygamy in their societies.  These 
changes have led Bedouin women to deal with multiple mechanisms of 
power both internally, as part of the patriarchal society, and externally, as 
an ethnic minority in Israel. 
                                                          
 7. Id. at 7. 
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A. Undergoing Change 
In the last sixty years, Palestinian Bedouin society has undergone 
dramatic changes in kinship structure, economic structure, and political 
power.  These changes have drastically impacted the sense of self and 
community among the Arab-Bedouin population in Israel.  The State of 
Israel forced the Arab-Bedouin people to resettle in impoverished 
townships and, as a result, they underwent a process of social and 
economic marginalization.8  Such constant changes have impacted gender 
relations, the status of Bedouin women, and the prevalence of polygamy in 
the Bedouin society of the Naqab.  Bedouin women face a new reality in 
which they are forced to deal with multiple mechanisms of power, both 
internally from the patriarchal Bedouin Society and externally from the 
State of Israel. 
In the first half of the 20th century, Bedouins had a sedentary existence 
in the north of the Naqab.  They subsisted on agriculture and pastoralism.9  
As the State of Israel came into being in 1947, between 11,000 and 18,000 
Bedouin people lived in the Naqab. 10  In the early 1950s, the State of Israel 
forced the Bedouin people to relocate to “muntagat as-siyaj,”11 where they 
lived under military rule until 1966.12  The State restricted the Bedouins’ 
mobility and required them to obtain special permits in order to pursue 
employment and educational opportunities in Israel.  Consequently, 
Bedouins, particularly women, had virtually no access to formal 
education.13 
Prior to 1948, women had played a significant role in Bedouin society, 
                                                          
 8. See, e.g., Abu-Rabia et al., supra note 6, at 29 (suggesting that the Israeli 
government policy of relocating nomadic Bedouins in towns has contributed to socio-
economic stratification within Bedouin society). 
 9. Cedric Parizot, Crossing Borders, Reinforcing Boundaries: Kin-Nection of 
Negev Bedouin in Gaza, the West Bank and Jordan, in CROSSING BORDERS, SHIFTING 
BOUNDARIES: PALESTINIAN  DILEMMAS 60 (Sari Hanafi ed., 2008). 
 10. SHLOMO SWIRSKI & YAEL HASSON, ADVA CTR., INVISIBLE CITIZENS: ISRAELI 
GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD THE NEGEV BEDOUIN 6 (2005) (stating that the majority 
of Bedouins were expelled by the State of Israel, or fled to Jordan and Egypt, but many 
stayed in the Negev). 
 11. See id. (stating that Bedouins who had been uprooted from their homes 
relocated to an area in northeastern Negev called “Siyag”). 
 12. See Ghazi Falah, Israel State Policy Toward Bedouin Sedentarization in the 
Negev, 18 J.  PALESTINE STUD. 71, 78-79 (1989) (stating that in 1951 Israeli military 
authorities evicted and transferred eleven tribes from the “Siyag” to a “closed area” to 
the east of Beersheba, and prohibited this group from leaving this location for the next 
fifteen years). 
 13. See Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder, Does Education Necessarily Mean 
Enlightenment? The Case of Higher Education Among Palestinians-Bedouin Women in 
Israel, 39 ANTHROPOLOGY & EDU. Q. 381, 384 (2008) [hereinafter Abu-Rabia-Queder, 
The Case of Higher Education] (noting that it was not until 1988 that the first Bedouin 
woman was admitted to a university in the Naqab region, and that by 1998, only twelve 
Bedouin women had received their bachelor’s degrees). 
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and the division of labor between men and women was clear.  Women were 
in charge of farming while men were responsible for guarding the land and 
receiving visitors.14  Thus, Bedouin men were mostly dependent on the 
knowledge and decision-making of women with respect to domestic 
livelihood.  Bedouin women were also involved in decision-making on 
issues such as relations with neighbors and the marriage of their daughters, 
which meant that they exercised a certain amount of power.15  However, 
with the forced resettlements, women’s roles changed dramatically.  Their 
productive roles as farmers were no longer functional in their newly 
constrained domestic spaces.  As such, the resettlement process reinforced 
Bedouin women’s dependency on men. 
These changes led to a paradoxical situation that jeopardized the well 
being of the Bedouin women.16  The disintegration of the economic 
structure of the Bedouin society within the urban labor markets of Israeli 
society has forced Bedouins to rely on external economic resources that are 
beyond the direct control of its members, particularly Bedouin women.17  
As a result, changes in the economic structure of the family have excluded 
Bedouin women from positions of power and have increased their 
dependence on men.  This process led to social constraints in which 
Bedouin women are at risk of being left without the internal social support 
that previously enabled their socialization, well being, and contribution to 
social stability.18 
One significant change in women’s lives in the Naqab is the increasing 
prevalence of polygamy.  The prevalence of polygamy redefined Bedouin 
women’s marginality as they were suddenly subjected to triple 
marginalizations by being (1) women in a (2) patriarchal-tribal society as 
part of (3) an ethnic minority in a Jewish State. 
B.  Polygamy in the Literature 
Polygamy is defined as “a marital relationship involving multiple 
                                                          
 14. See AREF ABU-RABIA, THE NEGEV BEDOUIN AND LIVESTOCK REARING: 
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 40 (1994) (providing an example of the 
typical duties of Bedouin men and women). 
 15. See Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder, Coping with ‘Forbidden Love’ and Loveless 
Marriage: Educated Bedouin Women from the Negev, 8 ETHNOGRAPHY 297, 301 
(2007) (asserting that Bedouin women’s productive roles have been abrogated by 
modern services). 
 16. See Gillian Lewando-Hundt, The Exercise of Power by Bedouin Women in the 
Negev, in THE CHANGING BEDOUIN 86 (Emanuel Marx & Ahron Shmoeli eds., 1984) 
(arguing that wage labor increases segregation from men and limits the extent of 
women’s power and influence). 
 17. See id. (discussing the rapidly decreasing presence of nomads in the Negev). 
 18. See id. (pointing out that new economic structures have major implications 
regarding social norms). 
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wives.”19  Polygamy is widely practiced in 850 societies across the world.20  
Polygamous marriages exist in the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Asia, 
and in some communities in Europe and North America.21 
Scholars have examined the various causes of polygamy.  In some 
societies, polygamy is a status symbol—a marker of a man’s economic 
success.22  Another potential reason for polygamy is the desire to increase 
the number of children within a family.23   
In certain societies, polygamy can be economically advantageous by 
increasing the labor power of the family, which in turn helps to increase the 
power and prestige of the family.24  Another reason may be demographic; 
women of marriageable age are more numerous than men, and child 
mortality rates are high.25  Other explanations for polygamy in Arab culture 
suggest multiple social, cultural, economic, and religious factors working 
together.26 
Studies of the prevalence of rates of polygamy in rural versus urban 
settings are inconclusive.  One study found no significant differences 
between the prevalence of monogamous and polygamous marriages on the 
basis of rural versus urban residency.27  Meanwhile, another study found 
that the number of wives per union in rural areas was higher than in urban 
areas.28 
                                                          
 19. Bobbi S. Low, Measures of Polygyny in Humans, 29 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 
189, 189 (1988). 
 20. Salman Elbedour et al., The Effect of Polygamous Marital Structure on 
Behavioral, Emotional, and Academic Adjustment in Children: A Comprehensive 
Review of the Literature, 5 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 255, 256 (2002). 
 21. Alean Al-Krenaw et al., Attitudes Toward and Reasons for Polygamy 
Differentiated by Gender and Age Among Bedouin-Arabs of the Negev, 35 INT’L J. 
MENTAL HEALTH, no. 1, 2006 at 46, 47. 
 22. See Roger Klomegah, Socio-Economic Characteristics of Ghanaian Women in 
Polygynous Marriage, 28 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 73, 76 (1997) (suggesting that 
polygamy differentiates between the haves and the have-nots). 
 23. See id. (pointing out that polygamy can serve as a means of achieving societal 
ideals and goals—namely having many children); see also Francis J. Sichona, The 
Polygny Fertilite Hypothesis Revisisted: The Situtation in Ghana, 25 J. BIOSOCIAL SCI. 
473, 481 (1993). 
 24. See Klomegah, supra note 23, at 76 (arguing that agricultural production 
depends on manpower, making a large number of children profitable); see also Halen 
Ware, Polygny: Women’s Views in a Transnational Society, Nigeria 1975, 41 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 185, 185-86 (1979). 
 25. See Klomegah, supra note 23, at 76 (emphasizing the desire to ensure the 
presence of children—important for labor, emotional support, and old-age security). 
 26. See Glenn E. Weisfeld, Sociobiological Patterns of Arab Culture, 11 
ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 23, 24 (1990). 
 27. Sara Ann Peterson, Marriage Structure and Contraception in Niger, 31 J. 
BIOSOCIAL SCI. 93, 103-04 (1999). 
 28. Cf. Klomegah, supra note 23, at 73 (suggesting that the higher frequency of 
rural polygyny in Ghana may have to do with rural widow remarriage). 
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Polygamous marriages are more common within Islam than in other 
religions.29  Polygamy has been an undisputed structure within Islamic 
family law for more than thirteen centuries, and some argue that polygamy 
persists nearly to the point of being ineradicable because it is derived from 
divine Islamic law.30 
Some interpret Islamic law’s approach to polygamy as protecting 
Muslim women because divine law restricts the number of wives a man can 
have, whereas, before Islam, a man could take as many wives as he 
wanted.31  Thus, restrictions on polygamy actually reduced the number of 
wives that men can take. Other interpretations of Islam’s impact on the 
practice have examined polygamy from a sociological approach.  During 
the expansion of the Muslim empire, many men died in wars.  Scholars 
argue that the institution of polygamy at that time served the purpose of 
taking care of widows and orphans.32 
Other interpretations suggest that polygamy is the exception to the 
general rule of monogamy in Islam,33 since polygamy is only permitted 
under certain conditions.  For instance, no man can have more than four 
wives at any one time, the man must be able to financially support more 
than one wife, and the man must treat all his wives equally.34  The most 
important condition is that of justice between co-wives.35  Reformist 
approaches have adopted a restrictive interpretation which argues that the 
threat of injustice will exist in nearly all cases of polygamy, necessitating 
the total ban of polygamy or heavy restrictions placed upon the practice.36 
C. Bedouin Women and Polygamy 
The practice of polygamy is a central part of Bedouin women’s lives. 
Some of them are part of polygamous marriages as co-wives.  Others are 
familiar with polygamy through family members who practice it.  Still, 
others encounter the practice from a professional context as social workers, 
                                                          
 29. See id. at 74 (finding that that rate of polygamy among Muslims was 47.2%, 
compared to only 17.3% among Catholics). 
 30. See TOVE STANG DAHL, THE MUSLIM FAMILY: STUDY OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN 
ISLAM 180 (1997) (clarifying that the Koran recognizes a place for polygamy despite 
urging caution in its adoption). 
 31. See id. at 181 (limiting the number of wives to four). 
 32. Id. 
 33. DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 237 (3d ed. 1998) 
(quoting V. P. BHARATIYA, SYED KHALID RASHID’S MUSLIM LAW 74 (3d rev. & enl. ed. 
1996)). 
 34. J. Chamie, Polygyny Among Arabs, 40 POP. STUD. 55, 55 (1986). 
 35. See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, FREEDOM, EQUALITY AND JUSTICE IN ISLAM 
77 (2002) (noting that the Moroccan Law of 1958 prohibits polygamy when the fear of 
injustice exists between co-wives). 
 36. See, e.g., id. 
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activists, lawyers, and so forth.  Additionally, polygamy fosters gender 
inequality because it “reinforces patriarchy and undermines women’s 
equality in marriage.”37 
While there is no accurate data on the real prevalence of polygamy 
within the Arab-Bedouin society, many estimates confirm that polygamy 
exists in between twenty to thirty-six percent of households.38  In the last 
twenty to thirty years, there has been a consistent increase in polygamous 
marriages at all levels of the Arab-Bedouin society.39  Polygamy is 
increasing regardless of age, education, or socio-economic status.  In the 
last twenty years, it has expanded at a rate of one percent per year.40  
Several studies examined the effects of polygamous marriages on 
Bedouin women.  One study focused on the psychological impacts and 
found that the women living in polygamous marriages suffer from psycho-
social damage.41  Another study found that domestic violence is higher 
among wives in polygamous families.42  Scholars report that Bedouin 
women in polygamous marriages in the Naqab perceive polygamy as a 
source of anguish, and conflicts have invariably been a salient feature in 
relationships among co-wives.43  A third study focused on comparisons 
between the co-wives and their mental health and showed that polygamy 
affects senior wives in polygamous families to a greater extent, 
economically and psychologically, than it does junior wives.44  Senior 
                                                          
 37. Lisa M. Kelly, Bringing International Human Rights Law Home: An 
Evaluation of Canada’s Family Law Treatment of Polygamy, 65 U. TORONTO FAC. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2007) (discussing how polygamy might have once served a protective 
function for “surplus” women in societies in which women outlived and married 
younger than men). 
 38. Lotan, supra note 6, at 1. 
 39. Abu-Rabia et al., supra note 6, at 23. 
 40. See id. at 9 (claiming that polygamous marriages have reached thirty to thirty-
five percent of marriages); see also Anat Lapidot-Firilla & Ronny Elhadad, Forbidden 
Yet Practiced: Polygamy and the Cyclical Making of Israeli Policy, CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & POL’Y STUD. 1, 9 (2006). 
 41. See Alean Al-Krenawi & Vered Slonim-Nevo, The Psychological Profile of 
Bedouin Arab Women Living in Polygamous and Monogamous Marriages, 89 FAM. 
SOC’Y: J. CONTEMP. SOC. SCI. 139, 145-46 (2008) (finding that women commonly 
suffered from lower levels of self-esteem and marital satisfaction and higher levels of 
depression, anxiety, hostility, paranoia; and problematic family function). 
 42. Alean Al-Krenawi & Rachel Lev-Wiesel, Wife Abuse Among Polygamous and 
Monogamous Bedouin-Arab Families, 36 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 151, 158 (2002) 
(disputing earlier findings that an increase in the practice of monogamy had increased 
wife abuse in Arab cultures). 
 43. See Abu-Rabia et al., supra note 6, at 26 (noting that ‘dharrah,’ the term for co-
wife, is also the term for enemy in Bedouin dialect). 
 44. Alean Al-Krenawi et al., The Psychological Impact of Polygamous Marriages 
on Palestinian Women, 34 WOMEN & HEALTH 1, 3, 12 (2001) (defining a senior wife as 
any married woman whose husband later married another woman and noting that first 
wives often experience feelings of failure when their husbands take additional wives). 
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wives report lower self-esteem than junior wives45 and have an increased 
risk of mental disorders.46  The communications between the wives 
concerning their children has been characterized by competition, hostility, 
and jealousy.47 
Studies have not found a conclusive relationship between the frequency 
of polygamy and education in Arab-Bedouin society.48  Research has 
shown inconsistencies in the relationship between the education level of 
men and women and the frequency of polygamy.  In Bedouin society, no 
significant differences were found between the education level of two 
groups of Arab-Bedouin women, where one group was composed of senior 
wives in polygamous marriages and another group was composed of wives 
in monogamous marriages.49  
Most of the literature regarding polygamy within the Bedouin society 
deals with several aspects of polygamy—social, cultural, economic, 
demographic—and its effect on women and children.  Most of the existing 
literature focuses on psycho-social effects and does not consider the rise of 
polygamy as a mixture of internal and external factors—cultural, 
economical, social, political, and legal—that also impact the prevalence of 
polygamy.  The literature also neglects to consider the invisibility of 
Bedouin women in the eyes of the Israeli law. 
The increasing prevalence of polygamy contrasts with the rise of the 
education rate among Bedouin women in the last three decades.50  Further, 
it contrasts with the process of “urbanization” that the Bedouin society has 
experienced in the last 60 years.  This appears to be the paradox of 
“modernization” as a concept used by the State of Israel to associate 
modernization with education and urbanization, and thus to justify the 
process of taking control over Bedouin land.51 
                                                          
 45. Alean Al-Krenawi, Women of Polygamous Marriages in Primary Health Care 
Centers, 21 CONTEMP. FAM. THERAPY 417, 424 (1999). 
 46. Kutaiba Chaleby, Women in Polygamous Marriage in Inpatient Psychiatric 
Services in Kuwait, 173 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 56, 58 (1985); see also Lotfy 
Al-Sherbiny, The Case of First Wife in Polygamy, 8 ARABPSYNET E. J. 18, 23 (2005). 
 47. See Alean Al-Krenawi, Family Therapy with a Multiparental/Multispousal 
Family, 37 FAM. PROC. 65, 71 (1998) (describing the communications between the co-
wives concerning their children as competitive, hostile, and with a sense of jealousy). 
 48. See Alean Al-Krenawi, Women from Polygamous and Monogamous Marriages 
in an Out-Patient Psychiatric Clinic, 38 TRANS-CULTURAL PSYCHIATRY 187, 191 
(2001) (finding that women in polygamous marriages obtained 3.88 years of education 
while women in monogamous marriages obtained 3.66 years of education). 
 49. But see Al-Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo, supra note 42, at 140. 
 50. See, e.g., Abu-Rabia-Queder, The Case of Higher Education, supra note 16, at 
384 (noting that by 1998, twelve Bedouin women had bachelor’s degrees). 
 51. See Sarab Abu-Rabia, Women, Education and Control, 8 ADALAH’S NEWSL., 
Dec. 2004, at 4 (discussing ways in which Bedouins are disadvantaged by the State, 
including schools integrated by sex). 
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These apparent contradictions cannot be explained merely from one or 
two perspectives. Rather, it should be seen as part of internal and external 
social, cultural, and political changes that impact women and the 
prevalence of polygamy.  These changes enable the State of Israel to 
construct polygamy as an external phenomenon to the legal system and to 
foster it. 
D. Reasons that Arab-Bedouin Women do not Resist Polygamy 
There are several reasons that explain why Arab-Bedouin women do not 
resist polygamy.  First, kinship defines the marital structure of Bedouin 
society, and Bedouin women do not have many options for marriages 
outside the family and tribe.  As such, marriage, including polygamous, is 
valued.  Second, Bedouin women are economically dependent on their 
spouses, making it that much more difficult for women to resist polygamy.  
Third, the patriarchal structure of the Bedouin society, which places 
Bedouin women at the bottom of the hierarchy, contributes to their limited 
ability to resist polygamy. 
1. Marital Patterns 
The marital patterns of the Bedouin society in the Naqab are based on 
kinship relations; marriages remain inside the family and the tribe.  There is 
a preference for marriages to cousins52 because blood is an essential part of 
the Bedouin cultural identity.53  Additionally, the origin of the tribe is a 
crucial factor impacting marital patterns in the Bedouin society. 
While Arab-Bedouin women face great pressure to marry, the patriarchal 
tribal structure of marriage limits their choices and often forces them to 
become parties to polygamous marriages.  Additionally, Bedouin women 
face social pressure against responding negatively to the prospect of 
sharing a husband.54 
There are many deeply held values and traditions related to female 
chastity, marital relations, and fertility.  Bedouin society values and 
admires fertile women.55  
2. Economic Dependency on Men 
The complexity of the social and economic reality of Bedouin women is 
                                                          
 52. SARAB ABU-RABIA-QUEDER, EXCLUDED AND LOVED: EDUCATED BEDOUIN 
WOMEN’S LIFE STORIES  67 (Eshkolot & Magnes eds., 2008) (in Hebrew). 
 53. LILA ABU-LUGHOD, VEILED SENTIMENTS: HONOR AND POETRY IN A BEDOUIN 
SOCIETY 64 (1999). 
 54. See id. at 228 (finding that negative reactions to the prospect of sharing a 
husband are discouraged). 
 55. Id. at 125. 
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largely based upon their economic dependence on men.  The social, 
economic, and political reality of Arab-Bedouin women makes it difficult 
for them to eliminate the phenomenon of polygamy; more than ninety 
percent of Arab-Bedouin women are unemployed,56 and over sixty-
percent of the Bedouin teenage girls residing in unrecognized villages drop 
out of school.57 
Bedouin women’s dependence on men for economic support ultimately 
undermines their social status and bargaining power, and exacerbates their 
subordination to men.  As Bedouin women, they suffer several hardships—
such as trying to provide basic living conditions for their families in 
impoverished villages, being an ethnic minority oppressed by a colonial 
power, and enduring subordination within their own communities as a 
result of tribal patriarchy. 
3. Choices and Prices 
The reality for Arab-Bedouin women is that of ongoing debilitation and 
exclusion from the power structures of Bedouin society.  These women 
struggle for their place in a patriarchal tribal society, which refuses to 
surrender the social supremacy which has been granted to men, by men.  
As part of an oppressed, national community, Arab-Bedouin women split 
as to how to connect their “emerging sense of national identity and 
participation with their emerging political identities as women.”58 
Arab-Bedouin society expects women to accept polygamy as an integral 
part of their lives and requires them to cooperate with the mechanisms of 
oppression and exclusion.  Polygamy, although a destructive practice which 
undermines social normalcy, is legitimized in accordance with pseudo 
religious “permission.” 
The patriarchal structure of Bedouin society makes it difficult for women 
to resist polygamy since Bedouin society associates honor and autonomy 
with masculinity, but associates modesty and dependency with 
femininity.59  Bedouin women are expected to behave modestly, speak 
“softly,” remain “obedient,” and be sensitive to social contexts.60  Bedouin 
society also expects that women recognize their position in the hierarchy—
which is lower than men’s—and accept polygamy. 
                                                          
 56. MAA’N FORUM OF WOMEN’S ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NEGEV, THE ARAB 
WOMAN IN THE NEGEV: REALITY AND CHALLENGES 50 (2005). 
 57. SARAB ABU-RABIA-QUEDER, DROPOUT BY TEENAGE GIRLS FROM BEDOUIN 
SCHOOLS IN THE NEGEV: FEAR, DISCRIMINATION AND OTHERNESS 15 (2004). 
 58. See CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS, BEACHES & BASES: MAKING FEMINIST SENSE 
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 54 (1990) (depicting the struggles women experienced in 
Sri Lanka while coping with gender and cultural forms of oppression). 
 59. ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 54, at 118. 
 60. Id. at 180. 
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Women who resist polygamy are subjected to social pressure and may 
pay a “high price” for acting against social norms.  In extreme cases, their 
families might ostracize them.  Given the social context and their 
invisibility in the eyes of the State, Bedouin women often are forced to 
make choices from a limited set of options. 
III. POLYGAMY AND THE LAW 
International law regards polygamy as discriminatory and harmful to 
women’s physical, mental, sexual, reproductive, and economic health.  
Under the Israeli punitive code, polygamy is a criminal offense.  However, 
it is permitted according to the Shari’a law that governs Muslims in Israel, 
and the State of Israel does not enforce the punitive code on the Bedouins 
with regard to polygamy. 
A. Polygamy Under International Law 
International law regards polygamy as a practice that violates women’s 
right to be free from all forms of discrimination.61  Women’s rights 
activists contend that the practice of polygamy violates many of the 
fundamental human rights recognized in international law.62 
For instance, the Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) states that a 
“polygamous marriage contravenes a woman’s right to equality with men, 
and can have such serious emotional and financial consequences for her 
and her dependents that such marriages ought to be discouraged and 
prohibited.”63  The Committee noted, with concern, that some State Parties 
to CEDAW permit polygamous marriage in accordance with personal or 
customary law, despite constitutions that guarantee equal rights.  Polygamy 
violates the constitutional rights of women and breaches the provisions of 
Article 5(a) of the Convention.64 
In a similar vein, the U.N. Human Rights Committee opined that 
equality of treatment with regard to the right to marry implies that 
                                                          
 61. See Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), art. 16(1)(b), G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/34/36 (Dec. 18, 
1979) (requiring State Parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination in family relations, particularly a woman’s right to enter into marriage). 
 62. See REBECCA J. COOK & LISA M. KELLY, DEP’T OF JUST. CAN., POLYGAMY AND 
CANADA’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1, 2 (2006) 
(arguing that the notions of obedience, modesty, and chastity preclude women from 
operating as full citizens). 
 63. U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
General Recommendation 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, ¶ 14, U.N. 
Doc. A/49/38 (Apr. 24, 1994). 
 64. Id. 
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polygamy is incompatible with this principle.65  Polygamy violates the 
dignity of women and is an inadmissible discrimination against women. 
Consequently, it should be “abolished wherever it continues to exist.”66 
Polygamy relies on obedience, modesty, and chastity, which together 
preclude women from operating as full citizens.  Women in polygamous 
marriages are socialized into subservient roles that prevent them from fully 
participating in family and public life.67  Thus, polygamy under 
international law is an oppressive practice to women. 
B. Polygamy Under the Israeli Law 
1. Tension Between Family Law and the Punitive Code 
“Family law in Israel is governed by the principle of religious personal 
law in family matters[:]” thus, Shari’a governs Muslims in Israel.68  Shari’a 
law in Israel permits polygamy.  However, according to the Israeli penal 
code (“punitive statute”),69 polygamy is a criminal offense.  Under the 
penal code, “a married man who will marry another woman and a married 
woman who will marry another man will be sentenced to five years in 
prison.”70  
The penal code allows polygamous marriages for non-Jews in Israel in 
two cases: (1) if one’s former spouse is unable, due to mental illness, to 
agree to marriage expropriation or marriage cancellation; or (2) if one’s 
former spouse is missing, and there exists a reasonable concern for his life, 
due to his whereabouts being unknown for at least seven years.71  
Polygamy, as practiced by the Arab-Bedouin, does not meet these criteria. 
2. Lack of Enforcement 
The State of Israel does not enforce its prohibition on polygamy in the 
case of the Arab-Bedouin of the Naqab.72  This lack of enforcement by the 
State of Israel encourages the practice of polygamy.  From 2005 to 2006, 
the police conducted only four investigations among the Bedouin 
                                                          
 65. Id. ¶ 16. 
 66. Id. ¶ 24. 
 67. Cook & Kelly, supra note 63. 
 68. RUTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL A STATE OF THEIR OWN 227 
(2004). 
 69. See Punitive Statute, § H cl. 176 (1977) (declaring that polygamous marriage is 
a criminal offense). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Lotan, supra note 6, at 6; see also Lapidot-Firilla & Elhadad, supra note 
41, at 4 (noting that a number of Middle Eastern countries also permit polygamous 
marriages, despite legal prohibition, due to religious practices). 
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population for alleged violations of the Israeli punitive code prohibiting 
polygamy.73 
Legal authorities claim that there are evidentiary difficulties in proving 
polygamous marriages because most polygamous marriages are not 
registered officially by the Sharia’a court and take place informally.74  
According to the state’s attorney’s office, to file charges against a suspect 
of polygamous marriage the state must have evidence of a binding marriage 
ceremony.75  Some law enforcement authorities hold the view that 
“polygamy is an acceptable norm among the Bedouin society, [sic] 
therefore there is no need to fight against it.”76  Moreover, such law 
enforcement authorities explain their lack of enforcement by stating that, 
“women in polygamous marriages do not file complaints against their 
polygamous husbands and do not cooperate with the police.”77  Samira, 
who did complain, did not elicit any reaction from the police. 
Lapidot and Elhadad argue that the failure to enforce the law against 
polygamy is rooted in the general failure of the government to execute its 
own policy against any of its populations and that Israel is not specifically 
targeting the Arab-Bedouin.78  One reason for this is that Israel may lack 
cultural understanding and does not relate to the contribution of public 
narratives in its political process.  Lapidot and Elhadad also argue that 
polygamy is an example of the ineffectiveness of legislation as a tool for 
implementing policy.79 
This approach to policy weakens women and increases their gender-
based marginalization, which stems from their increasingly restrictive 
patriarchal society and ethnic marginality from the Jewish State.  It limits 
the power Bedouin women have and reflects the State’s indifference 
towards women.  Bedouin women know that the State does not enforce the 
law; some of them tried to challenge it but they did not succeed because of 
the patriarchal and colonial power. 
                                                          
 73. Lotan, supra note 6, at 6. 
 74. An example is “zawag urfi,” which means marriage with the presence of two 
witnesses and the father of the bride.  According to Islamic Law these marriages are 
valid but according to the Israeli law the second wife will be considered as “known in 
public,” which is an acceptable term used by State authorities to recognize couples that 
live together without marriage.  See id. 
 75. STATE ATT’Y OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR THE STATE ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 
GUIDANCE NO. 2.7, available at http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/99358E8A-
4587-400E-8C1C-760287367924/0/27.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
 76. Lotan, supra note 6. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Lapidot-Firilla & Elhadad, supra note 41, at  4 (explaining how Israeli laws 
on polygamy are circumvented by pretending to expel previous wives). 
 79. See id. at 5 (expressing doubts that proposed legislation on polygamy will be 
used by Bedouin women). 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE GENEALOGIES FOR POLYGAMY 
A. Patriarchal Power Versus Colonial Power 
To understand why polygamy is increasing among the Palestinian 
Bedouin in the Naqab requires applying an alternative genealogy that 
deviates from the conventional way in which polygamy has been explained.  
The patriarchal power and the colonial power operate in collaboration, 
leaving Bedouin women trapped in the margin of the Israeli society and in 
their own society.  While this Israeli policy towards the Bedouin may 
appear to be a laudable example of “multiculturalism,” as a matter of fact it 
is a guise for a policy that sanctifies and actively nurtures the values of 
obedience and resignation in Palestinian society.80 
Polygamy is increasing among the Palestinian Bedouin due to these two 
main mechanisms of power: colonial power and patriarchal power.  
Colonial power is the way in which Israel exercises its political power as a 
State towards its non-Jewish citizens.  Colonial power is not static; it is a 
product of changes associated with land, urbanization, economics, and 
politics beyond the State. 
Patriarchal power is the way in which Bedouin men exercise their 
domination over Bedouin women in a hierarchical society based on gender 
differences.  Such power operates actively and reactively at the same time, 
both within Bedouin society and in relation to the State and its colonial 
power.  Patriarchal power requires analysis in light of the changes that the 
Bedouin society has been through, with a particular focus on the link 
between property and women. 
Colonial power and patriarchal power operate together actively and 
reactively to exclude Bedouin women and to increase their marginalization.  
The State does not enforce the law and thereby enables Bedouin men to 
manipulate the system and practice polygamy.  The operations of the 
mechanisms of these two powers lead to the activation of two legal systems 
and to the externalization of polygamy from the legal system.  Bedouin 
women remain invisible in the eyes of the law. 
B. Unmasking Polygamy:  Polygamy from a Colonial Perspective 
1. The Colonial Discourse in Israel 
Colonialism is “a systematic, collective project of seizing and expanding 
control over contested lands, people, resources and power.”81  Since its 
                                                          
 80. See Manar Hasan, The Politics of Honor: Patriarchy, the State and the Murder 
of Women in the Name of Family Honor, 21 J. ISRAEL HIST. 1, 32 (2002). 
 81. Yiftachel, supra note 7, at 5. 
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establishment as a State, Israel has acted as a colonial power toward the 
non-Jewish population.  This article will focus on the Arab-Bedouin, 
Palestinian citizens of Israel residing in the Naqab. 
Israel exercises its colonial power with Zionist ideology as its premise.  
This ideology constructed the Zionist myth of a “land without people for a 
people without a land.”82  The Zionists created this myth for the purpose of 
making the false claim that Palestine was empty at the creation of the State 
of Israel.  This myth became the foundation upon which the settler 
movement operated and is similar to settler projects in other colonial 
contexts.83  The complex history of the Palestinian tragedy that began in 
1948 is absent from the official history of Israel because the historical view 
of the Palestinian population, up to the 1980s, was based on stereotypes 
and narratives that paid little heed to Palestinian culture and history.84 
Israeli exercise of the colonial power has taken different forms.  
Different groups within Israeli society have differential access to the State 
according to the criteria of nationality, ethnicity, religion, and gender.85  
The Israeli Ashkenazi Jews86 are the most dominant group in Israel—
economically, socially, and politically.  They determine other groups’ 
access to power.  On the other hand, the Arab-Bedouin of the Naqab, 
particularly women, are the most marginalized group in Israel, behind 
Arabs and Sephardic Jews.87 
Israel asserted its colonial power over the Arab-Bedouin population by 
using special mechanisms of control, including land confiscation, 
urbanization, and economic policy.  Israel perceived the Arab-Bedouins as 
a “problem,” treating them as “limited citizens,” rather than as Jewish 
Israeli citizens, and mandating that “special bodies” should deal with them 
indirectly through the mediation of tribal leaders.88  According to some 
commentators, Israel’s treatment of the Arab-Bedouins is “reminiscent of 
the relations that existed in colonial times between imperial States and their 
                                                          
 82. Nahla Abdo & Nira Yuval-Davis, Palestine, Israel and the Zionist Settler 
Project, in UNSETTLING SETTLER SOCIETIES 291 (Daiva Stasiulis & Nira Yuval eds., 
1995). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Ilan Pappe, Post Zionist Critique on Israel and The Palestinians: Part I: The 
Academic Debate, 26  J. PALESTINE STUD. 29, 32 (1997). 
 85. See Abdo & Yuval-Davis, supra note 83, at 308 (describing how ethnicity is 
just one of many social dividers). 
 86. Jews of European background. 
 87. See Abdo & Yuval-Davis, supra note 83, at 309 (explaining that Sephardic 
Jews are in the margin of the Israeli society as well because of their origins as Arab-
Jews and because of years of exclusion and discrimination by Ashkenazi Jews that 
were, and to certain extent still are, the most powerful group in Israel). 
 88. SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 11. 
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colonies.”89 
Moreover, Israel is engaging in both internal and external forms of 
colonization.90  Although Israel presents itself as a democracy, it may 
arguably be described as “an ethno-republic, the State of Jewish people.”91  
Under a normal application of the right to self-determination, Israel would 
be defined as an Israeli State and not as a Jewish State. However, Israel’s 
definition of itself as a Jewish State supports calling it an ethnocracy.92  
That is, on one hand, Israel has democratic features and formalities.  
Moreover, while it has not promulgated a national constitution, Israel does 
have basic laws that have constitutional status.93  Additionally, Israel’s 
legal system contains legislation that protects human rights.94  On the other 
hand, Israel has established a legal, institutional, and cultural regime which 
advances the undemocratic project of Juda-izing and de-Arab-izing the 
country.95  It has nearly twenty discriminatory laws that treat Arabs and 
Jewish citizens differently from one another.96 
The fact that Jewish “citizens of other countries have more rights in 
Israel’s land” and settlements than the Arab citizens of Israel is further 
evidence of the ethnocratic nature of the Israeli State.97  Israel imposes 
institutional and municipal regulations in rural areas—which do not apply 
to Jews—to prevent its Arab citizens “from purchasing land in about 80% 
of the country.”98  The problem of the Bedouin in Israel is not so much of 
being Bedouin, but rather of being Arabs in a Zionist State.99 
Before the establishment of the State of Israel, the future colonial 
government created a “status quo” agreement with the rabbinical 
authority.100  The “status quo” agreement set the guidelines for the relations 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 27-28. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Abdo & Yuval-Davis, supra note 83, at 306 (explaining this principle is 
best illustrated in the Law of Return).  
 92. Oren Yiftachel, ‘Ethnocracy’ and Its Discontents: Minorities, Protest and the 
Israel Polity, 26 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 725, 731 (2000). 
 93. See Basic Law: Human Dignity & Liberty, 5754-1994, SH No. 1454 p. 90 (Isr.) 
(establishing the basic values of the Jewish State); see also, Ruth Levush, A Guide to 
the Israeli Legal System, LLRX.COM (Jan. 15, 2001), 
http://www.llrx.com/features/israel.htm. 
 94. See, e.g., SH No. 1454. 
 95. Abdo & Yuval-Davis, supra note 83, at 307. 
 96. See generally LEGAL VIOLATIONS OF ARAB MINORITIES IN ISRAEL ADALAH 
(1998), http://www.adalah.org/eng/publications/violations.htm. 
 97. Yiftachel, supra note 93, at 741.  
 98. See id. (explaining that this permits Jewish settlements to select their own 
residents). 
 99. See id. (illustrating how the problem extends to the Druze, Palestinian-Arab 
citizens, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, and subjects of the Palestinian Authority). 
 100. See PATRICIA J. WOODS, JUDICIAL POWER & NATIONAL POLITICS 36 (2008) 
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between the State and the Jewish religion.  By this agreement, the orthodox 
authorities became the executive body of the colonial power.  They decide 
“who is a Jew” for the purpose of the Israeli Law of Return.101  The law 
enables Israel to control its demography and to ensure that it maintains a 
Jewish population majority.  Furthermore, the “status quo” agreement 
enables the State of Israel to activate its colonial power through family law 
by giving the religious courts the exclusive authority over personal 
status.102  The lack of separation between religion and the State of Israel, as 
such, has an adverse implication on women’s citizenship rights—regardless 
of their religion.  In particular, this lack of separation excludes Palestinian 
women from all decision-making circles concerning their family or 
personal status.103  Additionally, as a result of the exercise of colonial 
power, Arab-Bedouin women are excluded from full Israeli citizenship, 
which negatively impacts their access to civil, political, and social rights. 
Despite their exclusion and marginalization, Palestinian citizens have 
engaged in different forms of resistance since the 1950s.104  In light of this 
resistance, gender relations affect the “complex historical dynamics of the 
Zionist settler project.”105  The negotiations regarding power between the 
Zionist State and the indigenous Bedouins have effectively created a 
governing dynamic that has affected the Arab-Bedouin women and, 
consequently, determines their gendered roles.  
2. Civil Servants Exoticize the Bedouins 
Civil servants have exoticized the Bedouins since the inception of the 
State of Israel.  This occurred first though military rule and later through 
the actions of civilian ministers, namely, “special authorities”106 that dealt 
with the “other Bedouin.”107  The process of exoticism affected Bedouin 
                                                          
(explaining that, in accordance with this agreement, the orthodox community agreed to 
participate in the new State by exerting orthodox control over religious matters, such as 
kosher dietary laws, Sabbath observance, possibility for Jewish religious education, 
religious marriage, and personal status issues in general). 
 101. See The Law of Return, 5710-1950, SH No. 51 p. 159 (Isr.) (providing that all 
Jews, wherever they come from, are automatically entitled to Israeli citizenship). 
 102. See WOODS supra note 101, at 36 (explaining there was no major challenge to 
this authority until the late 1980s). 
 103. See Abdo & Yuval-Davis, supra note 83, at 309 (excluding both Muslim and 
Christian Palestinian women from these circles).  
 104. Id. at 311. 
 105. See id. at 316 (comparing gender relations to the other political and social 
relations in Israel and Palestine). 
 106. See SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 11, at 30-32 (noting the special 
governmental bodies that were established by the State of Israel to deal with the 
Bedouin, such as the ministerial committee for coordinating policy and activities in the 
Bedouin society). 
 107. Id. 
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women, because Israeli authorities portrayed them as exotic symbols of the 
“other.” 
Moreover, “[u]ntil 1966, Palestinian citizens of Israel were placed under 
military rule.”108  Villages were isolated from each other, “segregated from 
the Jewish population,” and “from the rest of the Arab population outside 
of Israel.”109  During this time, the military administrators acted as the sole 
representatives of every matter arising within Bedouin communities.110  
The settlements’ inhabitants needed special permits from the military 
governors to leave their villages, whether to seek employment or to visit 
relatives.111  Women had restricted mobility while men had most of the 
contact with the military administrators to obtain permits for work or for 
movement.112  The military governors’ rule operated through the mediation 
of sheikhs and did not involve direct contact with Bedouin citizens.113  
Arab-Bedouins “almost entirely depended on the good will of the military 
government.”114  The position of the military rule had more impact on the 
Arab-Bedouin in the Naqab than on the Arabs in the northern parts of the 
country.  This disparity likely resulted from the fact that the latter were 
better educated and more familiar with political procedures and therefore 
found it easier to wield political pressure and make use of the courts.115 
By the end of the military rule in 1966, the government administration 
shifted from the defense ministry to civilian ministries.116  However, 
contact with the Bedouin society was still not direct but took place through 
third party “special authorities.”  The Bedouin community is the only 
community in Israel for which a special government body is in charge of 
their “development.”117  The existence of “special authorities” to deal with 
the Bedouin community perpetuates the State’s image of the Bedouin as 
“savage” and “other.”  Thus, the “special authority” propagates the idea 
that the Bedouin are unlike “civilized Jewish citizens,” who, by virtue of 
their majoritarian and non-offending status, deserve direct and professional 
treatment from the various governmental ministers.  The establishment of 
                                                          
 108. Abdo & Yuval-Davis, supra note 83, at 307.  
 109. Id. 
 110. SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 11, at 29. 
 111. Abdo & Yuval-Davis, supra note 83, at 307. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Porat Chanina, Israel’s Policy on the Bedouin Issues and Left-Wing 
Alternatives, 1953-1960, in IYYUNIM  BITEKUMAT ISRAEL 431 (2000) (in Hebrew). 
 114. Id. at 421. 
 115. EMANUEL MARX, THE BEDOUIN SOCIETY IN THE NEGEV 39 (1974) (in Hebrew). 
 116. Cf. Isamel Abu-Saad, The Education of Israel’s Negev Bedouin: Background 
and Prospects, 2 ISRA. STUD. 21, 24-35 (1997) (describing the Military Administration 
era and its effect on Bedouin education and life). 
 117. SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 11, at 32-34. 
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the “special authorities” for Bedouins has created the image of Bedouins as 
incapable of exercising the right to self-determination.  In essence, the 
“special authorities” for the Bedouin population are the embodiment of the 
“divide and conquer” policy that the State uses to approach its Arab 
citizens.118 
The Israeli State created a situation in which individuals were in 
competition with local sheikhs who used their exclusive access to the civil 
administration to assert their power and ensure their social and political 
mobility.  The sheikhs acted at the expense of the rest of the Bedouin 
population which could not afford to compete because they lacked 
networks and education and because they had to fight  a perceived lack of 
competence.  Women were not part of this dynamic, which only served to 
increase their social marginalization. 
The State of Israel constructed its relations with its Arab citizens on a 
foundation of control, subordination, and oppression.  The Arab-Bedouins 
were not treated in the same way as Jewish citizens legally, socially, or 
politically.  The State perceives Arab-Bedouin women as a homogenous 
group; what is common to them is their subordination to men.  Because 
polygamy is justified as a traditional practice that has social legitimacy 
among young and educated Bedouin men, women cannot act against it 
because “their status in the patriarchal society is low and they lack any 
tools to change the situation.”119  The power relation is binary: men are the 
exploiters, and women are the exploited.120 
3. The Construction of the “Other” 
The increasing prevalence of polygamy is a direct result of Israel’s 
colonial power as exercised against the Bedouin population.  State 
authorities benefit from the practice of polygamy among the Arab-
Bedouins because it keeps them preoccupied in their internal affairs.121  It is 
much more crucial for Israel to keep the Bedouin in the Naqab preoccupied 
with their own “tradition” than to keep Arabs in other parts of Israel 
                                                          
 118. Cf. Yeela Raanan, My Shoes—I Can’t Find My Shoes—They Are in the Rubble, 
JERUSALEMITES (Aug. 19, 2007), http://www.jerusalemites.org/Testimonies/49.htm 
(describing how agents of the Authority for the Advancement of the Bedouins told a 
Bedouin man that his home was going to be demolished). 
 119. See Lotan, supra note 6, at 4; see also Abu-Rabia et al., supra note 6, at 31 
(contradicting the studies that relate monogamy with greater education and that show a 
negative relationship with polygamy). 
 120. See CHANDRA TALPADE MOHANTY, FEMINISM WITHOUT BORDERS 38-40 
(2003) (describing the problem associated with the binary definition of power is that it 
locks all struggles into the same binary structure). 
 121. See Yiftachel, supra note 93, at 730 (noting that the state laws enable one 
ethnic group essentially to dominate and seize the State by providing certain autonomy 
to the other groups in order to appease them). 
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preoccupied because the State and the Bedouin population, particularly, are 
still engaged in land disputes.  It is much more convenient for the State to 
define polygamy as the problem of the “other” and detach itself from its 
obligations toward this “other,” despite the fact that the Bedouin are Israeli 
citizens. 
The construction of polygamy as part of the “other” Bedouin customs 
and norms serves as a barrier between State and subjects and shifts the 
Bedouin’s focus from external (disputes over land) to internal (maintenance 
of the polygamous family) matters.  Women’s invisible status as second 
class citizens is primarily the product of Israel’s status as the colonial 
power, which has sanctified the customs by deferring to the “general code 
of tribal custom.” 122  The colonial power of the State operates by setting up 
visible and hierarchical distinctions between the colonizers and the 
colonized.123  The physical and symbolic separation of the legal system in 
Israel and the establishment of the “special authorities” for Bedouins have 
rendered the perception that Bedouins are incapable of exercising their 
right to self-determination, with the exception of family law matters.  The 
“freezing” of such traditional practices as polygamy is also indicative of the 
colonial policy of the State of Israel.  Given these factors, the increasing 
prevalence of polygamy is a direct result of Israel’s colonial power as 
exercised against the Bedouin population. 
4. Polygamy as a Product of Change 
The State of Israel has exercised its colonial power in special ways that 
have led to the increasing prevalence of polygamy and the continuing 
invisibility of Bedouin women.  This article will now explore three primary 
forms that this exercise of power has taken and then examine the 
implications of each: (1) land confiscation, (2) urbanization, and (3) 
economic deprivation. 
a.  Land confiscation laws 
During the military rule from 1949-1966, Israel passed laws to enable it 
to confiscate land previously owned or used by the Bedouin population and 
to then register it in the name of the Israeli State.124  The Bedouin’s 
ancestral land was declared a military zone that the Arab-Bedouin could 
not enter.125  Because Israel permitted no formal construction in 
                                                          
 122. MOHANTY, supra note 121, at 62.  
 123. See id. at 59. 
 124. SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 11, at 14-16. 
 125. TARIK N. IBRAHIM, ARAB ASS’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BY ALL MEANS 
POSSIBLE: A REPORT ON THE DESTRUCTION BY THE STATE OF CROPS OF BEDOUIN 
CITIZENS IN THE NAQAB (NEGEV) BY MEANS OF AERIAL SPRAYING WITH CHEMICALS 20 
(Christine Koleski, Marie Hoehn & Jonathan Cook eds., Shaul Vardi trans., 2004). 
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the “muntagat as-siyaj,” the Arab-Bedouin population had to erect towns of 
shacks and tents.126  Meanwhile, Jewish settlers gained the valuable and 
fertile land in the northern part of the Naqab.  Within a few years, 50 
Jewish settlements were built on these lands.127 
 The State activated its colonial power over the indigenous Bedouin 
population by using the law as a mechanism of control to expropriate and 
displace the Arab-Bedouin of the Naqab.  The 1953 Land Acquisition 
(Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law128 gave the Israeli State the 
right to register previously confiscated land under certain conditions.  One 
of these conditions rested on whether the owner was in possession of the 
property on April 1, 1952.129  If not, then the Israeli State could register the 
land in its name.  This policy enabled the State to register in its name 
Bedouin land located outside of the “muntagat as-siyaj,” as, by this date, 
the forced removal of the Bedouin into “muntagat as-siyaj” was complete 
and few Bedouins could establish that they were in possession of the land 
on the required date. 
Another example of the State’s control is the 1965 Planning and 
Building Law130 that created the first Israeli master plans to identify 
existing and projected areas for construction in every part of Israel.  The 
authorities did not acknowledge the existence of the populated Bedouin 
villages on the original master plans and zoned this land as agricultural.  As 
a result, even the few currently recognized villages cannot receive a 
building permit.131  The zoning law also criminalized existing villages by 
categorizing them as illegal or unrecognized.  By doing so, some populated 
areas became legitimate and others illegitimate in the eyes of the Israeli 
law.  Half of the Bedouins live in these villages, which do not have basic 
services such as paved roads, running water, garbage disposal, health care 
services, and an education system, because the State of Israel denies 
them.132  The State of Israel prohibits permanent construction in the 
unrecognized villages; those who do construct permanent structures risk 
heavy fines and the demolition of their permanent structures.133  
                                                          
 126. Oren Yiftachel, Bedouin Arab and the Israeli Settler State: Land Policies and 
Indigenous Resistance, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLE BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND 
GLOBALIZATION 31 (Duane Champagne & Ismael Abu-Saad eds., 2003). 
 127. Id. at 33. 
 128. Land Acquisition Law (1948-1987) (Isr.),”Laws of the State of Israel: 
Authorized Translation from the Hebrew, Volume 7”, Government Printer, Jerusalem, 
Israel (1948-1987), p. 43-45. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 330-93. 
 131. SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 11, at 60-61. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See NEGEV COEXISTENCE FORUM FOR CIVIL EQUALITY, THE INDIGENOUS 
BEDOUINS OF THE NAQAB-NEGEV DESERT IN ISRAEL (Ariel Dloomny et al. eds., 2008) 
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As a result, the Arab-Bedouin have become strangers in their own lands.  
Their movement has been restricted, and their collective identity has been 
disrupted and reshaped.  The Arab-Bedouins have acquired a status similar 
to refugees in their own land within a very short time period.134  These 
rapid changes have affected Bedouin women’s identities, roles, and status.  
The story of the land has generally come from a male perspective; 
however, women have a strong tie to the land, which is part of their identity 
and history as Bedouin women. 
b.  Urbanization 
In 1962, the Israeli State established seven Bedouin townships in 
“muntagat as-siyaj.”135  The purpose of this plan was to establish the 
presence of the State in most of the remaining lands in “muntagat as-siyaj,” 
which would put an end to the Bedouin claims of ownership rights to the 
land.136  The government also stated the purpose of its plan: to secure land 
suitable for settling Jews, for setting up Israel defense force bases, and to 
remove the Bedouin population from key Naqab routes.137 
This approach is a direct reflection of the policy of Israel’s previous 
military regime.  The overarching agenda was to control the Bedouin 
populations and to minimize Bedouin control over land.  Today, these 
villages are on the margin of the Israeli society economically, socially, and 
politically. 
The process of resettlement into townships affected Bedouin women.  
Their farming skills were no longer needed in the settlements, and the State 
did not provide them with workplaces that were appropriate for their skills.  
Most of the men relied on employment in the Jewish cities,138 while women 
stayed at home with no employment apart from their roles as wives and 
mothers.  As a result, Bedouin women became more economically 
dependent on men than they had previously been. 
Following the Bedouin transfer to the permanent settlements, the State of 
Israel, claiming the mantle of the “advanced” and “modern” West, 
                                                          
(discussing the ramifications of Israeli policy on the indigenous Negev Bedouin 
populations). 
 134. Ghazi Falah, Israel State Policy Toward Bedouin Sedentarization in the Negev, 
18 J.  PALESTINIAN STUD. 71, 78-79 (1989). 
 135. See SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 11, at 9 (explaining that the State 
rationalized this move by citing to the precedent of the Ottoman and British Mandatory 
periods). 
 136. See id. (noting the consistency in the State’s view that Bedouin land was State 
land and that the Bedouin have no legal title to such land). 
 137. Chanina, supra note 114, at 454. 
 138. Aref Abu-Rabia, Employment and Unemployment Among the Negev Bedouin, 4 
NOMADIC PEOPLES 84, 85 (2000). 
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evaluated the “modernization” of the Arab-Bedouins.139  A “modernity 
discourse”140 described Bedouin women as going through social and 
cultural shifts which altered their status from prolific producers in a 
nomadic society to consumers in an urban society. 
Such discourse, however, fails to explain the increasing prevalence of 
polygamy, despite the pseudo “modern” education of Bedouin women and 
the process of urbanization.  The explanation for this paradox is that 
“modernity” is the discourse of the “other” and does not reflect the true 
situation of the Bedouins.  In fact, the opposite is true.  Patriarchy has 
grown stronger since the exercise of colonial power by Israel. 
c.  Economic Deprivation 
In light of Israel’s exercise of colonial power, it is crucial to ask what 
remained of the humiliated proletarian men.  Seeking employment in 
Jewish cities and seeing their ancestral lands given over to Jewish 
settlement has caused Bedouin men to lose their dignity as providers of 
economic resources to their families.  Struggling to regain a sense of 
dignity, Bedouin men have turned to the practice of polygamy to exercise 
power by playing the role of “male” at home.  Thus, practicing polygamy is 
one of the only ways that Bedouin men can exercise their dominance in the 
“modern” State of Israel.  Being a man is to have not only many children, 
but also many wives.  In order to understand the relationship between 
polygamy and power, one should consider the fact that wealthy people and 
Sheikhs practiced polygamy as a status symbol in the past.141 
The need for Bedouin men to practice polygamy to regain their power in 
society sheds light on the new subservience that Bedouin women 
experience.  Arab-Bedouin women cannot participate in the discourse that 
constructs Bedouin men and cultural patriarchy as part of hegemonic 
masculinities.142 
                                                          
 139. Safa Abu-Rabia, Between Memory and Resistance, An Identity Shaped by 
Space: The Case of the Naqab Arab Bedouin, 8 HAGAR STUD. CULTURE POL. 
IDENTITIES (Special Issue) 93 (2008). 
 140. See id. at 95 (providing the discourse that described the process of “transition 
from nomadism to modernism” of the Arab Bedouins and how this process described 
the Bedouin as categorically positioned on the low end of the scale, gradually moving 
up toward its western, civilized end through the adoption of technological innovations 
and improved living conditions characteristic of a Western lifestyle). 
 141. See EMANUEL MARX, BEDOUIN OF THE NEGEV 138 (1967) (noting that the most 
popular way for a Sheikh to increase his status and power was to marry more women, 
as this built up his family and bolstered his effectiveness in his tribe). 
 142. See MOHANTY, supra note 121, at 62 (discussing the limitations placed on 
women and widows in a patriarchal system designed to serve the economic interests of 
a gendered political economy). 
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d. Politics Beyond the State 
When Israel occupied the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and 
Gaza, the majority of Bedouin who remained in Israel could maintain their 
link with their kin and neighbours in these regions.143  After the 1967 War, 
the Green Line144 was no longer an obstacle to movement.  While it 
remained a political border, Israeli authorities allowed people to cross both 
ways.145  In this new political reality, Bedouins were further able to develop 
and strengthen links with their Palestinian kin.  People went shopping on a 
daily basis in the markets of Gaza and the south Hebron Mountains.146  
Bedouin developed matrimonial alliances with members of their families 
from whom they were separated in 1948.  Later, Bedouin men sought their 
brides among peasant families,147 and the low price that Palestinian families 
demanded for the bride gave Bedouin men the opportunity to marry more 
than one wife.148 
C.  Polygamy and the Operation of the Patriarchal Power 
The State, however, did not operate in a vacuum and could not alone 
account for the increase of polygamy among the Arab-Bedouins.  The 
operation of the patriarchal power has itself changed with the changes that 
Bedouin society has been through and has taken different forms as a 
suppressive and resistance power. 
1. The Patriarchal Power as a Product of Change 
The patriarchal power operates actively and reactively at the same time 
within Bedouin society as well as with its relations to the State of Israel as 
a colonial power.  It changes over time.  In order to understand how the 
mechanisms of power operate in the Bedouin society, there is a need to 
examine the forms of patriarchies that characterize Bedouin society and to 
establish a nexus between gender, the State, and patriarchy.  Mechanisms 
of power cannot be studied in such a way so as to isolate them from their 
relationships with mechanisms of exploitation and domination.149 
Polygamy in the Naqab takes place in the context of patriarchal control 
                                                          
 143. Parizot, supra note 10, at 5. 
 144. The border between the State of Israel and the occupied territories. 
 145. Parizot, supra note 10, at 5. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Lewando-Hundt, supra note 17, at 87. 
 149. See Michel Foucault, Afterword to BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND 
HERMENEUTICS, THE SUBJECT AND POWER 208 (2d ed. 1982)  (explaining why the 
study of power is important, how power is exercised, what constitutes power, and how 
to explain and analyze power and power relationships). 
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within the Bedouin society.  Polygamy is not solely a legal issue that 
operates in the context of colonial power.  Rather, it is an interdisciplinary 
issue that extends beyond the legal sphere.  Polygamy is simultaneously a 
legal, social, cultural, and political issue and is mostly a product of change.  
For many of the issues accompanying polygamy, there is a colonial 
component that fosters its continuity as a traditional practice. 
2. The Patriarchal Power as Suppressive Power 
a. Hierarchy and Power 
Bedouin society is hierarchical and segregated by gender.  Kinship 
defines most relationships in Bedouin society; one’s sense of “belonging” 
to the tribe and of belonging to one’s immediate family are among the most 
important Bedouin values.150  In polygamous families, a wife who is related 
by blood to her husband is usually better treated than her co-wives.151  
Bedouins, as a people, value men over women, and the strength of the tribe 
is measured by the number of men.  Bedouin society perceives women as 
morally inferior to men, giving women a secondary status.152  In other 
words, the tribal system is male-oriented. 
From a patriarchal perspective, polygamy may be indicative of the 
perceived loss of “muscularity” of the Bedouin tribal authorities, since they 
are no longer free and autonomous under Israel’s colonial power.  The 
events subsequent to Israel’s formation have rendered the tribal authorities 
powerless and have caused a loss in the social order of Bedouin tribal 
authorities.  As a result, Bedouins have developed a deep nostalgia for past 
political structures.  This idealization of traditional Bedouin practices has 
caused past norms and customs, which had previously been practiced with 
irregularity, now to become “central” to Bedouin identity.  In this respect, 
polygamy may be a regression to the old patterns of the Bedouin in reaction 
to the colonial power. 
One of the most significant values of Bedouin tradition is the connection 
between land and the honor, “Alard Walard,”153 which is used by Bedouin 
to emphasize that women and land have the same status and should be 
protected to the same degree.154  At the heart of the moral system of the 
Bedouins are honor and modesty.155  When the State used its colonial 
                                                          
 150. ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 54, at 12-15. 
 151. Id. at 57. 
 152. Id. at 123. 
 153. In Arabic: “the land and the honor.” 
 154. According to the Bedouin belief system, the punishment for harming a woman 
is very severe; four times that for injuring a man. 
 155. ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 54, at 78. 
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power to confiscate land, the patriarchal powers took different forms, all of 
which affected women.  Because Bedouins have lost land, one of the most 
important assets of the lineage honor, women are the only “property” left to 
the tribes.156  Women’s modesty is tied inextricably to their sexuality.157  
Thus, the defense of “honor” is now exercised almost exclusively through 
sexual control of women. 
The tribal patriarchal power and a “code of honor” govern Bedouin 
women’s sexuality.158  The greatest threat to the tribal system is 
unrestrained sexuality.159  A significant mark of sexual control is the tribal 
consensus on marriage.  The status of married women is higher than single, 
divorced, or widowed women.  Bedouin society pressures unmarried 
women to marry.  Because female sexuality is intrinsically linked to the 
community’s sense of honor, polygamy is reminiscent of the corollary need 
for the community to control women’s sexuality through marriage. 
Polygamy, as a mechanism of control, takes place by making sure that 
sexual relations are “institutionalized” and takes place in a “legitimate” 
marriage. The increasing prevalence of polygamy may be an indication of 
the increasing “need” to control women’s sexuality.  Why else would there 
be a pressing need to “protect” the social order and the tribal system in 
comparison to the past, before the interference of the State in Bedouin’s 
affairs?  Could it be that women’s sexuality is threatening the tribal 
system?  One possible explanation is that the Israeli colonial power 
shattered the Bedouin tribal structure and internal order and dislodged the 
different segments of the tribe and hierarchy that previously “controlled” 
women’s sexuality.  In their new reality, the powerful members of the 
Bedouin society (men) feel a need to strengthen their tribal order and re-
construct it. 
3. The Patriarchal Power as a Resistance Power for the Colonial Power 
“Where there is power there is resistance.”160  Abu-Lughod suggests 
using resistance as a diagnostic power.161  She found resistance to the 
Egyptian State among Awlad Al-Ali Bedouins after Egypt sought to 
                                                          
 156. See Abu-Rabia et al., supra note 6, at 29, 30  (describing the treatment of 
women and measures to increase economic status in reaction to the strong pull 
downwards on the Bedouin’s economic status from the State). 
 157. ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 54, at 107. 
 158. See id. at 86 (describing both the cognitive and pragmatic components of the 
“honor code” and noting that the Bedouin honor code is less complex than that 
regarding women in Spain, Sicily, or Algeria). 
 159. Id. at 119. 
 160. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 95-96 
(1978). 
 161. Lila Abu-Lughod, The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformation of 
Power Through Bedouin Women, 17 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 41, 42 (1990). 
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“integrate” the Bedouins of the western desert into its State.162  This 
example serves to demonstrate the way in which freedom and fearlessness 
are a part of the social identity of Bedouins.163 
In the case of the Arab-Bedouin of the Naqab, polygamy can be 
explained as resistance to the State and to the colonial power it activates.  
Given that Bedouin society values freedom and autonomy,164 it is 
understandable how external oppression from a ethnocratic government can 
translate into internal “autonomy” manifesting itself through adherence to 
cultural practices such as polygamy. 
The State weakened Bedouin society and destroyed the social, cultural, 
and political structure of the tribe.  It displaced the Bedouin population 
internally by depriving them of their ancestral lands, forcing them to 
“resettle” and to “modernize” in faltering townships, and relegating half of 
the population to unrecognized villages.  Bedouin’s attempt to resist this 
colonial repression by increasing their focus on the only spaces that the 
State left for them: the spaces of tradition.  Unfortunately, that very same 
space is also used to entrench patriarchal power and to subordinate women 
within the tribal hierarchy. 
Polygamy reflects the profound distress that engulfs the Arab-Bedouin 
society today.  It exposes a collective identity crisis, the origin of which is 
the abrupt and imposed transfer of Arab-Bedouins—whether to 
impoverished permanent communities or to a reality of living in tin 
shacks—and to home demolitions, poverty, and a resultant loss of hope.  
The difference in relative prevalence of this phenomenon before and after 
the State’s intervention in the Bedouins’ way of life supports this 
explanation.  In the past, only a few Arab-Bedouin men married more than 
one woman.  In general, the phenomenon was common mainly among 
Sheikhs and the wealthy.  Now, it permeates all socioeconomic levels of 
Bedouin society.165  Today, the phenomenon exists in so many families that 
the Arab-Bedouin society seems to be experiencing a severe regression; its 
patriarchal patterns are becoming more extreme as a reaction to the State’s 
exclusionary approach toward Bedouins. 
Power operates in multiple arenas.  The contexts of neo-colonialism, 
local patriarchy, and culture and customs all simultaneously dominate 
Arab-Bedouins.166  Arab-Bedouins operate in the in-between spaces of the 
                                                          
 162. Id. at 43. 
 163. ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 54, at 88. 
 164. Id. at 117. 
 165. See Abu-Rabia et al., supra note 6, at 23 (noting the increase in the percentage 
of Bedoin women in polygamous relationships over the last 20 to 30 years). 
 166. See Abdo & Yuval-Davis, supra note 83, at 308-09 (depicting the various 
factors working against the Arab-Bedouins). 
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colonial power and their own patriarchal power.  Polygamy has significant 
meaning in the intersections of the mechanisms of power.  On one hand, 
Arab-Bedouin women face domination by the patriarchal structure of their 
own society, which legitimizes polygamy.167  On the other hand, they are 
part of an ethnic minority that itself faces control and marginalization by a 
colonial power. 
4. Encouragement of Patriarchy 
Because Israel ignored the issue of Arab-Bedouin women as an internal 
matter, the patriarchal Bedouin social structure became the sole authority 
dealing with internal Bedouin issues and “their women.”  The Bedouin 
patriarchal structure became free to exercise power—but only in Bedouin 
society, which became the only “legitimate” space in which an Arab-
Bedouin could act freely.  The patriarchal space occupied by Bedouin men 
has met with encouragement by Israel since the country’s establishment 
because it has strengthened the Israeli State.  The State supported Bedouin 
religious leaders expressing traditional views by granting them special 
favors and recognizing their traditional values.168 
State authorities reinforced the patriarchal structure by giving special 
treatment to the traditional patriarchal leadership in granting them respect 
and economic and social preference.169  The government supported Arab 
tradition, which stabilized a dominant role for the Palestinian patriarchy by 
reinforcing the patriarchal structure and the hamula (clan) that had begun to 
weaken before the establishment of the State.170  In this way, the State 
sought to ensure that the religious establishment would be “loyal” to the 
State.171 
By accommodating the patriarchal authority, the State authorities sought 
to destabilize the situation of Arab-Bedouin women for the sake of State 
stability.  Arab-Bedouin women are not perceived as citizens but rather are 
treated as “exotic symbols” of colonial rule.172  They are invisible citizens 
in the eyes of the law.   
The presence of the Israeli colonial power serves to keep polygamy and 
tribal affairs within the power of Bedouin men.  The colonial rule’s 
                                                          
 167. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black Britannia 
to Black America: Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty-
First Century, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 811, 824 (2001) (citing Chandra 
Mohanty, Introduction: Categories of Struggle, in THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE 
POLITICS OF FEMINISM (1991) (describing the struggle of women, in particular)). 
 168. Hasan, supra note 81, at 19. 
 169. Id. at 22. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 19. 
 172. ENLOE, supra note 59, at 42-44. 
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emphasis is not to abolish the domination of the Bedouin men over the 
Bedouin women but to establish an Israeli rule over them both.  It acts as a 
colonial power by transforming the existing patriarchies and class 
hierarchies according to its own agenda.173 
D.  Polygamy as a Phenomenon External to the Legal System 
1. The Activation of Two Legal Systems 
The State of Israel simultaneously activates dual legal systems against 
the Bedouin population: (1) the legal system relating to land and 
demography and (2) the legal system relating to family law.  The first 
system represents the sovereignty of the State and the mechanisms of 
enforcement of the State over the public sphere.  The second system, 
governed by the religious courts, represents legal matters relating to the 
private sphere. 
The State activates a colonial power in both instances.  In the first 
system Israel acts as both State and colonizer.  In the second system Israel 
does not act—native norms are for the native to control.  This creates a 
strict dichotomy between the State-based punitive law and a religion-based 
family law.  On one hand, the State prohibits polygamy under its punitive 
code.174  On the other hand, it does not enforce this prohibition in the case 
of the Bedouin population.175  The presence of a colonial power explains 
this paradox.   
In terms of rights, the implementation of law leaves little power to 
women and gives more power to men to exercise their patriarchal power. 
Bedouin men usually overcome the legal obstacle to marry another woman 
by not registering the first marriage with the Israeli authorities.  Local 
governments have turned a blind eye to this practice by allowing the 
children of such unions to be added to the population registry under the 
first wife’s name or solely under a declaration of paternity.176 
Another technique that Bedouin men use to manipulate the legal system 
is to marry other women according to the Bedouin way, called “zawaj 
‘urfy.”  If they marry a woman from the Palestinian territories,177 they do 
not bring it to the attention of the Israeli authorities.  When the second wife 
                                                          
 173. See MOHANTY, supra note 121, at 61 (expanding on the consequences of 
women’s status in Arab and Muslim societies). 
 174. See HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 69, at 281 (describing the fact that 
polygamy is illegal in Israel under Israeli civil law). 
 175. See id. (indicating that the law against polygamy is not enforced, and that it is 
actually more widely practiced in recent years despite its prohibition under the law). 
 176. See Abu-Rabia et al., supra note 6, at 29 (indicating that this practice gives the 
children access to all relevant rights under Israeli law). 
 177. West Bank or Gaza Strip. 
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gives birth in an Israeli hospital, the Bedouin man will claim that the wife 
is his “girlfriend,” “known in public,”178 or will simply sign “documents as 
the legal father of the baby without stating that the mother is his wife.”179 
The two bifurcated legal systems of the Israeli State externalize 
polygamy as a legal phenomenon and allow Bedouins to practice their 
customary law in the guise of “multiculturalism.”  However, the State 
grants this autonomy only in the family law sphere, leaving Bedouin 
women outside the legal system as invisible citizens. 
2. Lack of Enforcement Encourages Polygamy 
The Israeli government “encourages” the Arab-Bedouin to practice their 
culture to the fullest extent, under the purported interests of “cultural 
sensitivity” and “multiculturalism.”  Israel’s lack of enforcement of its 
criminal statute prohibiting polygamy encourages the practice of 
polygamy.  In this way, Arab-Bedouin men can channel their frustration 
and resistance to Israeli domination to the private sphere—toward women.  
The State could exercise its power over the Arab-Bedouin population 
“easily” under the cover of the “modern,” “civilized” State trying to “save” 
the “oppressed” Bedouin women from “primitive” Bedouin men.  Instead, 
the State acts as a colonial power towards those it seeks to colonize, 
thereby dominating that group by pushing aside the focus from its duties as 
a democratic State, and instead relegating the task to the “internal” matters 
of the Bedouin.  
This turns the Arab-Bedouin women into invisible citizens in the eyes of 
the law and increases their marginality within the Bedouin patriarchal 
society.  The State limits the rights of Bedouin women by “allowing” the 
practice of polygamy de facto.  Israel created a mechanism of “reciprocal 
relations” in which it will not enforce the prohibition of polygamy, but 
accepts it by acquiescence if, in return, the Arab-Bedouin men “keep the 
peace” in the Naqab.  
In these ways, polygamy is constructed as a phenomenon that is treated 
as external to the legal system because it is part of the cultural norms and 
tradition of the “other.”  The State authorities reinforce polygamy by 
neglecting to enforce their criminal laws, while at the same time 
constructing polygamy in a binary way which juxtaposes “us”—the 
modern, “culturally sensitive”—with to the practices of the primitive 
“other.” 
                                                          
 178. This term is used to indicate a situation in which spouses live together, in a 
familial frame without marriage. Usually this term is used by the Israeli Jews. 
According to Shari’a law, this is illegal. 
 179. Abu-Rabia et al., supra note 6, at 29. 
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V. WHAT ABOUT WOMEN: POWERLESS?  BEYOND THE BINARY OF THE 
COLONIZER 
As the author began to write this paper, she struggled with the 
ubiquitous, near-reflexive labeling of Arab-Bedouin women as “victims.”  
She is still struggling with the questions: How can we analyze polygamy 
without portraying Arab-Bedouin women as victims?  Is it possible not to 
attach such a label in this complex reality?  What is the counter narrative of 
Arab-Bedouin women in polygamous marriages?  How do they resist and 
how do they bargain with patriarchy?180 
It is important to look beyond the colonizer versus colonized binary and 
to look beyond talk of victimhood, a status intrinsic to the colonizer 
discourse.  The rhetoric of victimization reinforces an imperialist response 
towards women in the developing world and recreates the imperialist 
stance of viewing the subject native as uncivilized and backward.181  
Bedouin women have a story to tell that is a product of a complicated 
reality.  This story is beyond the internalization of oppression and consists 
of their life circumstances and their political and social reality. 
A. Future Questions 
1. The Role of Bedouin Women 
Bedouin women are not helpless, frozen in time and space.  They play a 
role and they are still in the midst of a change.  Their social mobility is 
constantly changing and reshaping.  In the last sixty years they have gone 
through rapid, dramatic changes in so many aspects of their lives. 
Bedouin women play different roles based on their different backgrounds 
and places.  Their social and political power determine their bargaining 
powers and their ability to make change.  Bedouin women are gaining 
power gradually in different ways and forms.  These ways are sometimes 
hidden from the conventional way in which we think about power and 
resistance.  The process of changes that Bedouin women are going through 
will determine the role that they will play vis-à-vis polygamy and in 
resisting it. 
                                                          
 180. Dniz Kandiyoti, Bargaining with Patriarchy, 2 GENDER & SOC’Y 274, 274-85 
(1988). 
 181. See Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the 
“Native” Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 1, 18 (2002) (“[I]n the international arena, the victim subject, in the 
context of the primary focus on violence against women, creates an exclusionary 
category built on racist perceptions and stereotypes of Third World women.”). 
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2.  Polygamy Should Be Examined in Light of These Complexities 
Polygamy should be examined in light of the complex reality of Arab-
Bedouin women and their identities.182  They are women, wives, mothers, 
Arabs, Bedouins, Palestinians, and Israeli citizens.  They are sometimes 
monogamous and sometimes polygamous.  They are invisible citizens in 
the eyes of the law, and they are invisible women in the eyes of the 
patriarchs.  They are part of an ethnic group that struggles for its survival 
and its dignity.  They are powerful and challenge their reality.  And they 
have a story to tell us. 
3. The Counter Narrative 
Bedouin women operate and resist in spaces of subjugation.  What is the 
counter narrative that Bedouin women are presenting?  How can we study 
the discourse of polygamy without portraying Bedouin women as victims?  
Can Bedouin women deconstruct the mechanisms of power and suggest a 
counter narrative for polygamy?  What are the strategies that Bedouin 
women use to bargain with patriarchy and to unmask the colonial strategy 
of the State? 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Polygamy is a case study that demonstrates the way that the mechanisms 
of colonial and patriarchal powers operate in Israel to silence and debilitate 
Bedouin women.  These powers preserve the absence and transparency of 
Bedouin women by collaborating to externalize polygamy outside the legal 
system.  The institutional and intra-societal factors reinforce this 
phenomenon and grant it legitimacy under the guise of a supposed “cultural 
sensitivity” by the State, on the one hand, and social legitimacy by the 
patriarchs on the other. 
Polygamy in the Bedouin-Arab society in the Naqab is not a 
phenomenon that occurs in a vacuum.  It is part of the characteristic reality 
of the lives of Arab-Bedouin women in the Naqab.  This is a reality of 
ongoing debilitation and exclusion, in which the Arab women struggle for 
their place in a patriarchal tribal society. 
The Israeli establishment reinforces this reality through “divide and 
conquer” mechanisms of control that are methods of exerting colonial 
power.  The Israeli establishment strengthens the tribal leadership in order 
to maintain peace and quiet in the Naqab.  The Arab-Bedouin women pay 
an exorbitant price for this.  Bedouin women find themselves forced to 
cooperate with the mechanisms of oppression and exclusion. The 
phenomenon garners support from a religious interpretation and gains 
                                                          
 182. Wing, supra note 168, at 833. 
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social legitimacy from various directions, which makes it difficult to 
conduct a rational and intelligent discussion of the phenomenon.  Thus, 
legitimacy manifests as a destructive phenomenon that undermines the 
cornerstones of social norms. 
The jarring silence of the State of Israel and the patriarchal society are 
warning signs of the way in which Bedouin women face marginalization.  
Future study is necessary to bring out the counter narratives of Bedouin 
women facing polygamy and to analyze the way in which Bedouin women 
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